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“Die Natur... Ichsprachnicht von ihr. Nein, was wahrist, und was falschist, 
alles hat siegesprochen. Alles ist ihre Schuld, alles ist ihr Verdienst”
(Johann Wolfgang Goethe, “Die Natur”, 1783)
Abstract. The perspective drawn from evolutionary science, undoubtedly one of the 
most remarkable intellectual achievements in our conception of the world, poses 
a deep challenge to epistemology and the meaning of truth. The present paper aims 
to examine the difficulties offered by the prevailing biological model for the emergence 
and development of mind in its attempt at constructing a possible philosophical theory 
of truth. We propose a solution which, while preserving the priority of the distinction 
between truth and falsehood, is nonetheless capable of reconciling its philosophical 
fundamentals with the scientific evidence concerning the evolutionary origin of our 
capacity to recognize truth and falsehood.
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1. The problem
When we try to apply the important and ineludible evolutionary perspec-
tive to the emergence of the most complex psychic faculties of the human 
species, a deep conceptual challenge arises in a naturalized epistemology1. 
As some authors have highlighted (Street 2006; Copp 2008; Kahane 2011), 
there is a true “Darwinian dilemma” for any realist theory of value, if by 
“realist” we understand the philosophical position which defends the in-
dependence of value statements from our evaluative attitudes2.
According to the theory of evolution, forces such as natural selection 
have played a key role in shaping our psychic faculties and therefore our 
capacity to evaluate reality (through the dichotomy “true/false” in the epis-
temological realm and “good/bad” in the ethical sphere). No unjustified 
extrapolation would appear if we admitted that evolutionary forces must 
have influenced our evaluative attitudes, necessarily determined by the 
natural dynamics that have contributed to their constitution. However, 
the problem refers not so much to the evolutionary dependence of our 
evaluative attitudes but to the possible evolutionary independence of val-
ue (like truth) as such. Clarifying which type of relationship has existed 
between naturally evolved evaluative attitudes and the realm of values 
(in this paper we will focus on the distinction between truth and falsehood) 
is still a problem to be solved in a convincing way, because the connection 
between evolutionary forces and our evaluative faculties is not trivial: we 
do not know if it should be formulated in terms of sufficient or merely 
necessary conditions.
If naturally evolved evaluative attitudes are the sufficient condition 
for the existence of value, we must say that evaluative judgments depend 
on psychic faculties which are inexorably subordinated to the influx of 
1 For an overview of evolutionary epistemology and an access to the most relevant litera-
ture on the subject, see the homonymous article written by M. Bradie and W. Harms in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Bradie and Harms 2011).
2 Examples of this position can be found in (Nagel 1989; 2012; Dworkin 1996; Shafer-
-Landau 2003; Enoch 2011). For a comprehensive defense of the possibility of naturalizing 
epistemology, see (Allen and Leiter 2001).
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evolutionary forces. Therefore, they lack autonomy and values as such do 
not properly exist. They simply represent exemplifications of the general 
mechanism governing biological nature: the development of a series of 
abilities as instruments to satisfy the adaptive pressures exerted by the 
environment. If naturally, evolved evaluative attitudes are the necessary 
but not sufficient condition for the existence of value, it is legitimate to 
defend the following position: although evolutionary forces have served 
as the basis for the development of certain psychic potentialities, once the 
latter have emerged, they display a series of properties which cannot be 
reduced to purely evolutionary causes. Rather, they enjoy a relevant degree 
of autonomy.
As we can easily notice, an apparently sectorial question opens the 
window for exploring a deep epistemological matter: the evidence for 
considering reality as being structured into different levels, some of 
which could perhaps be irreducible to others. But why do different levels 
exist? A courageous naturalistic vision must embrace reductionism, even 
if it recognizes the huge complexity of the “frontiers” that separate the 
different levels. However, a basic insurmountable irreducibility between 
certain levels exists (perhaps only in the epistemological sphere), as we 
will show.
Evolutionary explanations of the realm of human values normally at-
tempt to reduce ideas such as truth and falsehood to their biological foun-
dations. The principal concept, the explanatory master key for achieving 
this ambitious enterprise, resides in natural selection, a force acting on 
individual variations in order to favor those which turn to be more advan-
tageous for survival (of the individual?; of the group?; of the species?; of 
all of them at once?; we do not know)3.
For example, some authors have proposed mechanisms regarding the 
evolution of the human capacity to form metarepresentations. As Sperber 
writes, “there is a plausible scenario where a metarepresentational ability 
develops in the ancestral species for reasons having to do with competition, 
3 See (Ball 2013).
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exploitation and co-operation, and not with communication per se. This 
metarepresentational ability makes a form of inferential communication 
possible, initially as a side effect, and, probably, rather painstakingly at 
first. The beneficial character of this side effect turns it into a function of 
metarepresentations, and creates a favorable environment for the evolu-
tion of a new adaptation, a linguistic ability. Once this linguistic ability 
develops, a co-evolutionary mutual enhancement of both abilities is easy 
enough to imagine” (Sperber 2000, 129).
According to Darwin’s theory of descent with modification (Darwin 
1859), advantageous variations will be inherited by the next generations if 
they facilitate adaptation to the environment: if a trait turns to be herita-
ble, then it will persist in the offspring if it shows a certain degree of util-
ity for adaption. The epistemological presuppositions of this explanatory 
frame seem clear: the more complex levels are susceptible to reduction into 
their chronological or physiological “antecedents”. If we leave aside the 
difficulties of this project, in light of its failure in other branches of knowl-
edge4, aggravated by the absence of a scientific theory which convincingly 
explains why reality is structured into levels that maybe irreducible (and 
why new properties emerge in the whole that do not exist in its parts5), we 
will indicate how unfruitful it is to try to reduce the realm of values into 
evolutionary forces. Its failure reveals, in our view, a deep epistemological 
gap within the universe of human knowledge. But before continuing, we 
want to make clear that we do not embrace any kind of “mystical” ap-
proach to nature which fragments reality into irreducible levels. We believe 
that all levels of complexity ultimately result from the power of matter to 
evolve over time and achieve higher degrees of development in the physi-
cal, chemical, biological, and psychological realms. Rather, we aim to show 
that there is an epistemological need for distinguishing between different 
4 Mathematics cannot be reduced into Logic (Gödel 1931), and Biology is hardly reducible 
into Physics and Chemistry, since concepts such as natural selection and the famous dis-
tinction between Umwelt and Innenwelt in living beings are difficult to express in purely 
physical-chemical terms.
5 The examination of how the binomial integrated by “parts” plus “interaction” transforms 
parts themselves may constitute the explanatory key to this difficulty.
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levels, but this requirement does not probably involve any kind of onto-
logical prohibition.
2. Truth or efficiency?
Let us admit that truth could be interpreted as a mere adaptive circum-
stance, id est, as the way in which a certain species navigates its own world. 
Then, it would be legitimate to state:
For species S(A), truth (its “world view”) is equivalent to T(A).
For species S(B), truth (its “world view”) is equivalent to T(B).
But how could we commensurate T(A) and T(B) if both S(A) and S(B) 
experienced the same world? According to an orthodox evolutionary par-
adigm of truth, T(A) and T(B) should respond to different world views. 
However, if the perception of truth were the byproduct of evolutionary 
forces (not an independent frame which we can grasp through evolutionary 
forces), in a given time and confronted with the same phenomenon, two 
truths would coexist: T(A) and T(B). If we leave aside the degree of com-
plexity possessed by each species A and B, both truths should be identically 
valid. But even if they referred to phenomena equally “perceptible” for both 
species, there should be a criterion capable of establishing which truth is 
correct. Let us suppose that a chimpanzee believes that there is a pred-
ator in a position in which someone has placed the hologram of a lion. 
Besides the chimpanzee, a man who knows that there is no lion at all, but 
only a holographic representation (which, if we take as criterion of truth 
actual physical existence, cannot be considered a true lion), stands. Let 
us suppose that for the chimpanzee T(A) differs from T(B). T(A) and T(B) 
cannot not be true at the same time if they contain opposite claims, for the 
principle of non-contradiction would be violated and anything could hold.
If truth were identified with efficiency, so that scientific explanations 
were true inasmuch as they were efficient and helped us adapt ourselves 
to our own world in a satisfactory manner, Einstein’s theory of relativity 
would not be provisional in the same way as it is for Popper (as the result 
of the impossibility that human knowledge faces in evaluating all possible 
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situations and all possible outcomes), but because it constitutes a particu-
lar adaptation, fulfilling the same evolutionary role than the “worldview” 
endorsed by any animal species. However, several problems emerge from 
this assumption. Superstition might be regarded as an efficient adaptation 
to a world which had not achieved a specific degree of social and economic 
development, never as an intrinsically false perspective concerning science 
and empirical truth. Of course, any relativistic, anti-scientific approach to 
the study of the world should be accepted, and from this “epistemological 
anarchism” of Feyerabendian resonances (Feyerabend 1975) no serious 
grounding of the scientific method, perhaps the pinnacle of human intel-
lect, could be offered.
Let us examine the several difficulties arising from the identification 
of truth with biological efficiency. First of all, how is it possible that a par-
ticular adaptation, which could be surpassed by a more efficient one in the 
future, may discover the fundamental laws of the universe? The question 
concerning the truth of a scientific theory would be meaningless: it would 
be true as long as it were “useful” for explaining certain empirical obser-
vations. Leaving aside logical and mathematical truths (“self-sufficient” 
adaptations whose realm of action would be constrained to the human 
mind; they would not enjoy universality), it is extremely implausible to 
think that a scientific theory (for example, the theory of chemical ele-
ments) constitutes a mere efficient adaptation to the environment. Those 
chemical elements really exist, not only on the basis of scientific method-
ology (precisely those canons which validate or refute Darwin’s theory and 
any evolutionary approach), but of reality itself. Popper (1935) establishes 
a necessary theoretical limit for scientific statements, but our observation 
that the Earth rotates around the Sun is indisputable (general relativity 
explains that it is the Earth that “falls” towards the Sun due to the latter 
curving the space more intensely). Of course, any scientific theory can be 
refined and improved towards some sort of “asymptotic limit.” Newtonian 
mechanics, which seemed the culmination of the scientific endeavor of 
mankind, succumbed to quantum mechanics and relativity in the early 
20th century. However, and in spite of this apparently endless “internal 
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progress” within each theory, we can say that we have discovered a truth 
about nature, as incomplete as it may seem6. If it were true only in accord-
ance with scientific canons, why should we accept it? Just because of its 
functionality? We would lack any serious epistemological reason to prefer 
Newtonian over Aristotelian physics. As long as a more refined model has 
not been proposed, we have no reason to deny the reality (beyond its cir-
cumscription to a certain theoretical model) of entities such as electrons 
and quarks.
It seems clear that if we renounce a criterion of truth, a full range of 
epistemological incongruities emerges, for a constructivist view of truth 
faces serious difficulties (not so much in the ontological as in the epis-
temological sphere). First of all, it does not explain why new levels flour-
ish. Secondly, it presupposes the possibility of reducing higher into lower 
levels, although this goal has not been factually achieved: deep fissures 
exist within nature and mind, as shown by Gödel’s theorem7 and the irre-
ducibility of the basic levels of reality into a fundamental “determination” 
(according to Heisenberg’s principle: the existence of processes which are 
not computable is highlighted by quantum mechanics8).
On the contrary, since it is clear, in the light of biological evidence, 
that our capacity for grasping truth is the result of evolutionary processes, 
so that our perception of reality depends upon the degree of development 
achieved by our nervous system (mediated, to a huge extent, by forces such 
as natural selection), an acceptable convincing link between truth and evo-
lutionary processes must be proposed. But if this hypothetical connection 
involved negating of the autonomy of truth, now subsumed into efficiency, 
insurmountable difficulties would originate and no fruitful epistemological 
result could be conquered.
6 Finite progress does not dissolve into infinite progress. A finite truth is a real truth. 
Against Hegel, it is not necessary to know the whole truth to be sure that we have reached 
a real, finite truth. Cantor’s work on the theory of transfinite numbers has clearly shown 
that it is possible to conceive of infinite yet numerable series (Cantor 1915).
7 On the difficulties that Gödel’s theorem poses to artificial intelligence and the theory of 
mind, see (Lucas 1961). 
8 On the importance of quantum indeterminacy for epistemology, see (Sols 2014).
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In addition to the former epistemological problems, we should also no-
tice that the consecration of biological efficiency as explanatory criterion 
poses great challenges. First of all, we do not know exactly over which units 
it is applied. Secondly, sometimes that which is successful involves the 
elimination of part of the descent: the success of some individuals, groups, 
or species generally implies the failure of others. The “counter-argument” 
holding that this scenario confirms natural selection falls into circularity: 
the statement that only those individuals which become adapted in the 
most efficient way survive does not clarify much about how to elucidate ex 
ante the most efficient adaptation, whereas unfolding it ex post succumbs 
to circularity. Thirdly, why is altruism possible? Why does not every indi-
vidual look for its own goals in terms of biological success? A posteriori, 
everything is successful, if success is measured in terms of rates of survival. 
But this realization is merely descriptive if not tautological. Were biological 
efficiency prior to truth in the epistemological realm, the world could be 
fragmented into as many “truths” as species, groups, or even individuals 
we could characterize.
No one would apply natural selection as the explanatory principle 
for justifying logical and mathematical truths. In the same way as no one 
would examine history, politics, and art only from the criterion of bi-
ological efficiency, as important as it may be for that which Ferdinand 
Braudel called “la longue durée” (Braudel 1958), it is hard to understand 
why it should play a predominant role in the birth of consciousness. If we 
accept the emergence of levels, we must commit ourselves to the idea 
that laws absent in lower levels can (at least potentially) arise in more 
complex levels. Biological systems do not violate the principle of con-
servation of energy, but on the sole basis of physical laws we will not be 
able to explain life and its adaptations. We need new principles, which do 
not rule over purely physical systems: natural selection, teleonomy… For 
example, Von Uexküll’s distinction between Innenwelt and Umwelt is not 
relevant (perhaps only functionally, but not fundamentally) in non-bio-
logical systems. The very idea of “selection” introduces a key conceptual 
novelty in biology.
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There is no reason to suppose that natural selection preserves its ex-
planatory power in the realm of human consciousness, in particular in 
its perception of truth. If the existence of different levels within reality 
seems to exhort us to respect their own frontiers and the epistemological 
principles ruling each of them, the abuse of natural selection9 in realms 
other than the biological development of organisms should be considered 
an unwarranted extrapolation. However, and since refined versions of Dar-
win’s theory constitute the only scientifically plausible model to explain 
the development of life, we are left with two propositions in order to rec-
oncile the primacy of biological efficiency in evolutionary forces with the 
epistemological priority of truth:
1) Darwin’s theoretical outcomes are incomplete but they still offer 
a global framework, which should be progressively refined.
2) The intelligibility of the world is consubstantial to the world itself 
and it only becomes patent once the central nervous system has 
achieved a certain degree of complexity.
The idea that our evaluative capacities have emerged “because they 
forged adaptive links between our ancestors’ circumstances and their re-
sponses to those circumstances” (Street 2006, 127) offers little explanatory 
power: why these links instead of others? Why should biological efficiency 
allow the appearance of falseness? What empirical proofs do we have to 
support this claim as a universal truth? How can we demonstrate that a cer-
tain evaluative attitude has been selected, if we can imagine different and 
even more successful evaluative attitudes that might have been generated? 
We inherit the capacity to evaluate, not specific evaluations, which must be 
learned or created by every individual. Because specific evaluative attitudes 
are learnt instead or created of being inherited, they cannot be selected 
by nature. The notion that nature selects flexible evaluative attitudes is 
too vague and it is not able to explain why we evaluate A instead of B in 
a particular situation: it may justify why we have “evaluative capacities”, 
9 For a classical critique of the adaptationist programme in biology (“based on faith in the power of 
natural selection as an optimizing agent”), see (Gould and Lewontin 1979), in which a pluralistic 
account of functionality and evolutionary account is proposed.
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but it does not vindicate why we adopt this or that evaluative attitude 
(its normativity). Also, we should notice that evaluative judgments are 
never automatic, at least if we achieve them through reflection (and we can 
always, at least as a theoretical limit, reach them through reflection), for 
we can always distinguish A from B. Therefore, they cannot be interpreted 
as mere “reflexes”, but as conscious acts.
3. A plausible solution
In our opinion, the only convincing way of naturalizing truth demands 
that we attribute both ontological and epistemological priority to this no-
tion (truth is equivalent to the world qua intelligible, but its intelligibility 
stems from its own “logical” structure), gradually perceived, with deeper 
degrees of insight, as the development of the nervous system propitiates 
the appearance of intelligence (the faculty of reasoning in order to achieve 
truth).
If, in imperiously simplified terms, the principle guiding the evolution 
of biological species, the motor force behind the expansion of the tree of 
life, can be summarized as “adaptive efficiency”, which should be under-
stood in terms of reproductive success, it is enormously difficult to justify 
the possibility of human judgments about truth and falseness from this ba-
sis alone. Truth would be constrained to an adaptive context, and it would 
never become independent from this “temporally efficient” biological 
niche under whose constraints it has emerged. However, this position leads 
us into absurdities. If we accept it, we do not possess any valid conceptual 
tool to elucidate whether the theory of evolution is true or false without 
succumbing to circularity. We are forced to consider it a “self-contained” 
explanatory frame. Therefore, it becomes unfalsifiable10. The existence of 
science demands careful respect for the independence of the duality “truth/
falsehood” in any explanation (not a mere description) which deserves to 
be called “scientific.”
10 For a discussion on the unfalsifiability of evolutionary psychology, see (Stamos 1996; 
Ketelaar and Ellis 2000).
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Our knowledge of natural history and genetics has offered undisput-
able evidence for accepting that species have evolved over time through 
purely natural causes. Both the scientist and the philosopher face an inelu-
dible dilemma: evolutionary forces have shaped the development of species 
and they have ultimately led to mankind11. We cannot analyze the explan-
atory leaks that still persist in current models of evolutionary theory, such 
as the probable insufficiency of the binomial “random genetic mutations” 
(source of variation) and natural selection for explaining the origin of new 
species, the emergence of biological novelty (paradigms such as “facilitated 
variation”, Kirschner and Gerhart 2009, seem to refine the Neodarwinian 
synthesis through the incorporation of the latest discoveries on epigenetics 
and developmental biology). Also, as we have already mentioned, we do 
not fully understand how natural selection works: does it act upon genes, 
individuals, groups…, or upon all of them at once, although this process 
could generate formidable incoherencies? Rather, we claim the necessity of 
establishing a connection between evolutionary forces (the biological basis 
for the development of human psychic faculties) and the independence 
exhibited, prima facie, by the objects of certain psychic faculties.
If evolutionary forces can be condensed into the principle of “prima-
cy of biological efficiency” and the world of human knowledge is based 
upon the distinction between truth and falsehood, it is neither possible 
to reduce the latter into the former nor to exclude the former from the 
explanation of the latter. If the distinction between truth and falsehood 
depends upon evolutionary forces, we cannot elucidate whether the scien-
tific theory created to explain evolutionary forces is true or false. Strange 
authorities would compel us to accept the theory of evolution as a totaliz-
ing, not contingent and self-contained explanation. However, this position 
violates basic criteria of scientific legitimacy. Anything would hold, for any 
11 We cannot know if this is a necessary outcome: we simply observe that humanity has 
emerged and we learn from our observation of the world that it constitutes the pinnacle 
of evolutionary complexity; whether this process is purely random or ineluctable cannot 
be decided on scientific grounds (Sols 2014), although evidence for some kind of “inex-
orable path” (some kind of “orthogenesis”) within evolutionary dynamics is in no ways 
conclusive.
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alternative theory claiming to be prior to the distinction between truth and 
falsehood could also be admitted on no other grounds that its own power of 
persuasion. But, on the contrary, if we exclude evolutionary forces from the 
explanation of the highest psychic faculties of the human being, we deny 
a vast array of empirical evidence. How can we escape from this labyrinth?
We think that the only convincing solution lies in defending that evo-
lutionary forces, guided by the primacy of biological efficiency, have led us 
into the most efficient adaptation: that which allows certain individuals 
to grasp the deepest nature of the surrounding world with increasing de-
grees of insight. In any case, the perception of the “reality” of the world 
must enjoy independence from the criterion of purely biological efficiency; 
otherwise, efficiency could not be actually achieved, for, eclipsed by the 
search of the highest adaptive success, no “independent” picture of the 
surrounding reality would be captured by those individuals. As a conse-
quence, obtaining the most efficient adaption to the reality to which they 
must become adapted would not be guaranteed. An adaptation capable 
of providing us with a more adjusted, deep, and “amplifiable” knowledge 
of the surrounding environment will always be more efficient. Grasping 
“truth” is extremely efficient in purely adaptive terms. Intelligence may 
have emerged as a form of adaptation to the environment (Piaget 1977), 
but its efficiency will be mediated by its power of revealing reality to the 
“adapting organism” in the most adequate form.
The distinction between truth and falsehood refers to the judgment 
about reality that an intelligent subject is capable of emitting. However, 
if its notion of truth merely evoked a form of adaption into a specific bio-
logical niche (as vast as it may seem), its possibility of effective adaptation 
to reality would face serious limitations. The onerous shadow of previous 
forms of adaptation would determine the implementation of new “adjust-
ments” to unexplored environments. The advantage of knowing the “truth” 
about the world with increasing degrees of insight, clarity, and accuracy 
resides in the huge number of “degrees of freedom” that it grants: since 
the individual can know how the environment actually is, it is therefore ca-
pable of gaining independence from environmental constraints, and it can 
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achieve a more efficient adaptation not only to the environment itself but 
also to new potential environmental contexts that may eventually appear.
According to current scientific evidence, it seems honest to admit that 
intelligence has emerged as the result of a series of progressive adaptations 
of organisms to the environment. One of these adaptations, affecting the 
most complex of all known organisms, possesses such a high degree of ef-
ficiency that it is not limited to fulfilling a specific biological role. Rather, 
it shapes the organism in such a way that it can apprehend the structure 
of the environment as such. The grasping of the intelligibility of the world 
stems from the highly efficient adaption experienced by a very complex 
species (Homo sapiens sapiens). Nevertheless, through this adaption, the 
realm of “truth” (defined as consonance or correspondence between the 
structure adopted by a certain organism in order to satisfy its biological 
needs and the structure of the environment itself) has been unveiled. The 
possibility of apprehending reality from a more “universal” perspective, no 
longer limited to a specific “point of view”, such as that of metabolism12, 
but open to “all points of view” (as intelligence enables us to do) bestows 
upon us a higher degree of autonomy from the environment and it allows 
for the development of a much more versatile inner world.
In summary, the distinction between truth and falsehood cannot be 
reduced to evolutionary forces in the epistemological realm. Epistemo-
logically, it has to precede evolutionary forces, which must have acted as 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of our perception 
of truth and falsehood. Otherwise, no true theory about evolutionary forces 
could be offered. Because it is utterly implausible to deny the “ontological” 
influx of evolutionary theories upon the emergence of those psychic fac-
ulties which allow us to grasp truth and falsehood, we seem compelled to 
accept the following thesis:
12 Any adaptation unfolds a certain dimension of reality. The metabolism of amoebae re-
flects something “universal”, but not in the same way as human intelligence, which can 
commensurate itself to all other forms of adaptation through a magnificent instrument: 
the power of understanding.
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Evolution has led us13 into a situation in which we can apprehend, with 
increasing degrees of complexity, reality as it is (as manifested by the out-
standing progress in the realm of natural sciences and in our knowledge of 
ourselves); but reality “as it is”, its intelligibility, precedes (both temporally 
and logically) or at least accompanies the display of those evolutionary 
forces which have paved the path for the possibility that human beings 
grasp the truth about reality.
4. Concluding remarks
Any theory, including Darwinian paradigms, must be susceptible to truth 
and falsehood. If the distinction between truth and falsehood were subor-
dinated to a certain conceptual frame offered by a particular theory, instead 
of a scientific theory we would find a meta-scientific explanation (cap-
tive to a dangerous spiral of “epistemological totalitarianism”), equivalent 
to a set of dogmatic, metaphysical claims which block the quest of truth. 
If a scientific theory submits itself to criteria of scientific falsifiability, it 
recognizes the priority and irreducibility of the distinction between truth 
and falsehood. If the theory of evolution is true, it is due to its suscepti-
bility to being true or false. Therefore, it is epistemologically contingent. 
The only epistemological necessity points to the distinction between the 
true and the false, that is to say: to the intelligibility of the world, which 
appears as “true” to a conscious being capable of distinguishing truth from 
falseness.
The only plausible explanation which makes evolutionary forces com-
patible with the epistemological autonomy of truth defends that biological 
13 Has this process been gradual or abrupt? The distinction between truth and falseness 
cannot be gradual (our perception of reality can certainly be gradual, but our distinction 
between truth and falsehood cannot, for there is a “critical point” at which the true differs 
from the false): we must have reached a level in the development of our evolutionarily 
shaped capacities for the perception of reality in which a dichotomy between truth and 
falseness emerged. Saltationism seems more plausible than mere gradualism. Just as the 
origin of life appears to be the result of a happy, hardly predictable accident, the emer-
gence of higher psychic capacities (language, consciousness…) could have faced some 
critical point prompted by a sudden genetic change.
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adaption has led us (gradually or through sudden leaps? It is hard to eluci-
date) into a situation in which we are capable of recognizing the distinction 
between truth and falsehood. However, truth and falsehood do not depend 
upon evolutionary forces but upon the intelligibility of the world, which is 
preexistent or at least “concomitant” to the action of evolutionary forces: 
it consists of the world itself inasmuch as it becomes manifest to a being 
that possesses higher intellectual powers. An efficient adaption has pro-
pitiated the “unveiling” of truth and falsehood through the endowment of 
a sufficiently highly developed brain; we do not know if through a happy 
“cosmic coincidence” (Bedke 2009) or an inexorable, gradual process that 
guides life into achieving higher degrees of complexity.
The reconciliation of the primacy (in Darwin’s theory) of biological 
efficiency as the natural driving force of evolutionary processes with the 
necessity of admitting scientific truth (understood not as efficiency but 
as congruency between a mental formulation and the real phenomenon 
addressed by our statement) demands accepting that evolutionary devel-
opment itself has led, through mechanisms still in need of a more refined 
scientific elucidation, to the emergence of a series of mental capacities 
structured in such a way that we can recognize the patterns ruling nature. 
In this model, efficiency is subsidiary: the key point lies in realizing that 
the human mind has acquired a structure and a set of functional powers 
of a dimension so that, beyond its “idiosyncrasy”, they can commensurate 
themselves to the structure of nature in a marvelously adequate form. This 
imperfect but indisputable isomorphism or parallelism between mind and 
nature allows us to state that the notion of truth (from the side of mind) 
is as valid as the idea of efficiency (from the side of biological nature). 
Denying this claim would imply to resuscitate some form of idealism, and 
I cannot believe that those who support a naturalistic explanation would 
ever claim to adhere to this option.
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